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Faculty and Deans

ESSAY
EXPLAINING GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER
NEAL DEVINSt
By approving race-conscious university admissions,' the Rehnquist
Court echoed the opinions of Congress, the states, big business, aca2
demics, newspapers, and, to a lesser extent, the Bush administration.
In short, rather than join forces with the politically isolated opponents
of affirmative action, the Court issued a ruling that conformed to social and political forces. For this reason, Gru,tter v. Bollinger was anything but surprising. Like most constitutional rulings, Grutter comported "with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking
3
Correspondingly, Grutter highm,Yorities of the United States."
lighted the pivotal role that elite opinion plays in shaping Court rulings.4 Even though public opinion on affirmative action was mixed to

1

Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of William and
Mary. The inspiration for this Essay was a dinner conversation with Bill Van Alstyne.
Bill's astute observations about the amicus filings in Grutter played an instrumental role
in my decision to write this Essay. Special thanks are also owed to Phil Chapman for
excellent research assistance and to Evan Benanti and his colleagues at the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review for encouraging me to write this essay. Thanks, finally, to
Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Mark Graber, Rich Hynes, John McGinnis, Rick Pildes, Anne
Sowers, and Bill Van Alstyne for commenting on a preliminary version of this Essay.
1
Grutter v. Bollinger, I23 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
2
While the Bush Justice Department argued that both University of Michigan
plans were unconstitutional, the President signaled to the Court that the White House
would support a decision approving some form of race-conscious university admissions.
See infra text accompanying notes II 0-13.
3
Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (I957). More recent scholarship has confirmed
Dahl's thesis. See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577
(I993) (noting the potential for government decisions to reflect majority will as viewpoints change); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the
judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 71 (I993) (describing empirical studies that show
that appointed justices often sustain majority opinions on social policy); Michael J.
Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolution, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 6
(1996) (questioning the assumption that the Justices will not consider a majoritarian
opinion).
4
See, e.g., LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT At'lD AMERICA.t'l POLITICS 216

(347)
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negative, economic and social leaders (who play a defining role in
shaping the Court's reputation) overwhelmingly supported racial
5
preferences. This Essay will highlight these social and political forces
and, in so doing, explain why the Court had strong incentives to ap6
prove affirmative action.
This Essay will also explain why the same forces that underlie Grutter also underlie Gratz v. Bollinger,' a companion case in which the
Court rejected the University of Michigan's automatic awarding of a
set number of points to all undergraduate minority applicants. By
placing limits on how universities take race into account while approving the Law School's plan to treat race as a plus factor in "individual8
ized" admissions decisions, the Court recognized that support for affirmative action is qualified. Correspondingly, the Court's mixed
decision allowed both the Bush administration and civil rights interests to rally around it. Finally, by disallowing one of the plans, the
Court was able to portray itself as an independent check on government without the fear of a majoritarian backlash.
Grutter and Gratz, in other words, appear to be the work of a Court
that maximizes its power by paying attention to the social and political
forces that surround it. This depiction is directly at odds with recent
depictions of the Rehnquist Court. By settling the 2000 presidential
election and invalidating thirty-one federal laws between 1995 and
2002, the Court has been characterized as "right-wing," "conservative,"

(2000) (discussing the Warren Court justices' differing perceptions on how to reach a
majority opinion when they were setting the discrete and insular minority standard);
Michael J. Klarman, What s So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 145, 18894 (1998) (describing the influence of culturally elitist and countermajoritarian opinions on the Court).
5
See infra notes 93, 97-104, 108 (listing the amicus briefs submitted by economic
and social leaders in Gruttuand Gratz).
6
This is not to say that the Court's only choice was to approve one of the University of Michigan's affirmative action plans. As Justice Anthony Kennedy's dissenting
opinion makes clear, the Court could have responded to majoritarian pressures by approving some race-conscious admissions while also invalidating both plans. See Grutter,
123 S. Ct. at 2370 (Kennedy,]., dissenting); see also infra text accompanying note 146
(providing additional discussion of a potential decision that would have garnered
Kennedy's support). For reasons detailed in this Essay, however, the Court had strong
incentives to uphold at least one of the two Michigan plans. See infra text accompanying notes 147-51 (describing the surrounding social pressures).
7
Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
8
See infra text accompanying note 153 (noting the Court's differentiation of the
Jaw school plan that allowed for independent consideration of applicants and the college plan that considered "nonindividualized" factors).
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"arrogant, self-aggrandizing, and unduly activist."!' Grutter and other
10
progressive 2002 term decisions, such as Lawrence v. Texas, were
11
therefore dubbed as "surprising" and "counterintuitive." The "normally conservative high court" "upend[ed]" expectations by "play[ing]
12
.
against type."
The truth of the matter is that Grutter and other 2002-2003 term
decisions follow the Rehnquist Court's practice of disappointing social
conservatives. Eleven years ago, the Court dealt a seemingly fatal blow
to the social conservative agenda by reaffirming both abortion rights
13
under Roe v. Wade and banning school prayer under Engel v. Vitale.
The decisions of the 2002-2003 term are very much in keeping with
earlier Rehnquist Court rulings on race, religion, and privacy. Specifically, the same social and political forces that stood in the way of
the Court's embrace of the social conservative agenda in 1992 remain
a roadblock today. For the Rehnquist Court, Grutter is a testament to
continuity, not change.
Grutter, however, calls attention to how it is that the Supreme
Court's identity is typically shaped by the Court's so-called swing Justices. On issues of social policy and federalism, Rehnquist Court decision making is largely defined by two Justices-Sandra Day O'Connor
9

See Cass R. Sunstein, Tilting the Scales Rightward, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2001, at A23
(stating that "[w]e are now in the midst of a remarkable period ofright-wingjudicial
activism"); Larry D. Kramer, No Surprise, It's an Activist Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2000,
at A33 (arguing that "conservative judicial activism is the order of the day"); Suzanna
Sherry, Irresponsibility Breeds Contempt, 6 GREEN BAG 2d 47, 47 (2002) (attributing accusations of arrogance and self-aggrandizement to Court critics); see also Barry Friedman,
Historicizing Constitutional Theory, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS 2 (forthcoming) (suggesting
that scholars' writings about the Rehnquist Court are shaped by their ideological and
political viewpoints).
10
123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (holding a Texas statute that criminalized same sex sexual conduct was unconstitutional).
11
See Linda Greenhouse, In a Momentous Term, justices Remake the Law, and the
Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2003, at Al (describing the Court's "surprising" decisions on
affirmative action and homosexual rights as displaying "a new attentiveness" to cultural
developments by "translating them into legal principle."); Tony Mauro, It's a Mad,
Mad, Mad, Mad Court: justices Upended i'.xpectations in 2002-2003 Term, TEX. LAw., July 7,
2003, at 12 (describing the Court decisions as a step back for conservatives).
12
See David G. Savage, justices Take a Tum to the Left, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 2003, at
A1 (characterizing the Court as "normally conservative"); Mauro, supra note 11, at 12
(describing the Court's progressive decisions as a departure from nine years of conservative analysis); Charles Lane, Civil Liberties Were Term's Big Winner, WASH. POST, June
29, 2003, at A1 (describing the Court's most recent term as "play[ing] against type").
13
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973), while replacing the trimester test with an undue burden standard);
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (extending Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), to
declare unconstitutional a prayer at an optional middle-school graduation ceremony).
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and Anthony Kennedy. Like prior swing Justices, O'Connor and
14
Kennedy are sensitive to social and political forces.
For example,
O'Connor, according to her brother Alan Day, "doesn't like to be part
15
of polarizing decisions ... 'she takes it hard and feels it hard."'
Kennedy is purported to pay careful attention to how his votes will
16
impact his and the Court's reputation. In other words, these justices
seem to look to signals sent to the Court by elected officials, elites, and
the American people in sorting out their opinions.
This Essay is divided into two Parts. The first Part details how the
Rehnquist Court has consistently heeded social and political forces in
its decisionmaking. The second Part focuses on the Grulter decision.
It describes the majoritarian forces that helped sway the Court and
explains how the Court's decision reflects those social and political influences.
I. THE PAST IS PROLOGUE

Constitutional decision making is a dynamic process that involves
17
all parts of the govemment and the people as well. As Chief justice
William Rehnquist noted, the "currents and tides of public opinion
lap at the courthouse door," for judges "go home at night and read
the newspaper or watch the evening news on television; they talk to
14

William Mishler & Reginald Sheehan, Public opinion, the Attitudinal Model, and
Supreme Court Decision Making: A Micro-AnaZvtic Pmpective, 58 J. POL. 169, 197 (1996)
(finding that moderates on the Court, who tend to be swing votes, have the greatest
response to changing public opinion). See also text accompanying notes infra 18, 93120 (detailing the social and political forces that contributed to the Court's deliberations in the Grutter and Gratz decisions).
11
' Evan Thomas & Stuart Taylor, Jr., She Helped America Seek a Middle Ground on the
Thorny Subject of Race, NEWS\\'EEK,July 7, 2003, at 46, 49 (quoting Alan Day).
16
Comments made by Justice Kennedy in an October 1992 interview provide support for this claim. In explaining why it is '"dangerous"' for a Supreme Court Justice
to think "'himself a philosopher,"' Kennedy remarked: '"History has its own way of
unfolding, tripping you up or vindicating you. You're required to look into a crystal
ball, but you don't see much there."' Jerry Carter, Crossing the Rubicon, CAL. LAW, Oct.
1992, at 39, 104 (quoting Kennedy).
17
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg have all endorsed this dynamic process. See The Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be Associate justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
222-23 (1987) (statement of Anthony M. Kennedy) (testifYing about the obligation of
Congress to pass legislation correcting erroneous rulings); SA.'\IDRA DAY O'CONNOR,
THE MAJES1YOFTHE LAw 44 (2003) (explaining that if"one looks at the history of the
Court, the country, and the Constitution over a very long period, the relationship appears to be more of a dialogue than a series of commands"); Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Speaking in a judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1186 (1992) (stating that effective
judges engage in a dialogue with other branches of government).
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18

their family and friends about current events." Supreme Courtjustices also "reflect . . . the views and values of the lawyer class from
19
which the Court's members are usually drawn." "[O]verwhelmingly
upper-middle or upper-class and extremely well educated, usually at
20
the nation's most elite universities," the views of economic and social
leaders matter more to the Court than to popularly elected lawmakers
(who must appeal to popular sentiment in order to win elections). In
particular, since the justices' reputations are shaped by the media, law
professors, and somewhat left-leaning lawyers' groups such as the
American Bar Association, they maximize their status by taking elite
• •
•
21
opmwn mto account.
Lacking the powers of purse and sword, moreover, the Court cannot resist "a determined and persistent lawmaking majority;" it can
22
only put its preferences in place against "a weak m<Bority." In sorting
out their personal views of how the Constitution should be interpreted, some Supreme Court Justices consider whether elected offi23
cials will comply with decisions. These Justices have weaker prefer-

18

William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20 SUFFOLK U. L.

REv. 751, 768 (1986). It is true that some Justices care passionately about an issue and,
thus, are unlikely to be swayed by majoritarian forces. But other Justices (often the
swing Justices who cast the decisive votes) have relatively weak preferences. It is likely
that these Justices are more apt to take into account the potential political fallout of a
decision.
19
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia,J., dissenting). For a parallel
commentary suggesting that the Court's ruling in Romer was fueled by cultural elites,
see Lino A. Graglia, Romer v. Evans: The People Foiled Again by the Constitution, 68 U.
COL. L. REv. 409,409-10 (1997).
20
Klarman, supra note 4, at 189.
21
See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Veering Left: The Art of judicial Evolution, NAT'LJ., July 5,
2003, at 2154 (noting recent decisions are contrary to the media depiction of the
Court); Frederick Schauer, Judicial Incentives and the Design of Legal Institutions
(1998) (unpublished working paper) (concluding that it would be a mistake to assume
that judges are less susceptible to reputation and public approval than other decision
makers), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/prg/schauer/judicial.htm. For an
argument that "heavy criticism" of Bush v. Gore "led to a term of unpredictable decisions" in which several Justices took "unexpectedly centrist positions," see Alan M. Dershowitz, Curious Fallout from Bush v. Gore, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2001, atA15.
22
Dahl, supra note 3, at 286.
23
See Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson, The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited: New Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences (2000)
(unpublished manuscript prepared for Midwest Political Science Association) (stating
that because the Court has to rely on the other two branches of government to give
judicial rulings full effect, Justices must consider the extent to which policymakers will
support their decisions), available at http://www.unc.edu/-jstimson/papers.htm; Lee
Epstein et. al., The Supreme Court as a Strategic National Policymaker, 50 EMORY LJ. 583,
585 (2001) (arguing thatJustices cannot be effective without considering the goals and
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ences about the substantive issues before the Court and, consequently,
are more willing to take account of the views of elites, elected officials,
24
and the American people.
The Supreme Court's practice of operating within parameters established by majoritarian forces is also tied to the judicial appointment process. Nominated by the President and confirmed by the
Senate, Supreme Court Justices are products of the social and political
forces at the time of their nomination. This process "favors persons
with ambivalent, unknown or centrist views on the hotly contested issues of the day;" those with known "militant views ... need not apply."25 Furthermore, even though Supreme Court Justices are insulated from political pressures such as election, several Justices have
26
held elected office or worked closely with elected officials.
These
Justices are accustomed to taking into account the views of interest
groups, the American people, and other elected officials.
For its part, the Rehnquist Court follows this historical pattern.
Social and political forces explain both its hesitancy to embrace the
social conservative agenda and its willingness, at least from 1995 to
27
2002, to break significant doctrinal ground on federalism. Consider,

reactions from the Legislative and Executive branches); Paul Gewirtz, Remedies andResistance, 92 YALE LJ. 585, 588 (1983) (stating that in response to resistence of citizens
and public officials to the Court's holding in Brown v. Board ofEducation,judges were
forced to approve "imperfect remedies, remedies that [did] not fully vindicate rights).
For a competing perspective, see JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD j. SPAETH, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 315-16 (2002), which contends that
Justices only care about personal preferences when casting their votes. For additional
treatment of this point, see text accompanying notes infra 90-91, 122-24.
24
See Mishler & Sheehan supra note 14, at 197 (concluding that judicial attitudes
"are dynamic and susceptible to change in response to public opinion as social change").
25
Mark A. Graber, Dred Scott Book 2-3 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author)
26
Consider, for example, the Rehnquist Court's swing Justices, Sandra Day
O'Connor and Anthony Kennedy. O'Connor was a state legislator and Kennedy's father was a state lobbyist. See Biographies of Current Members of the Supreme Court
(last visited November 23, 2003) (noting that Justice O'Conner was "appointed to the
Arizona State Senate in 1969 and was subsequently reelected to two two-year terms") , at
http:/ /www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf; Robert Reinhold,
Restrained Pragmatist Anthony M. Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1987, at AI (describing
Justice Kennedy's father as "a politically connected lawyer and lobbyist in Sacramento").
27
I have made this point in other writings. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Congress as Culf:rrit: How Lawmakers Spurred on the Court's Anti-Congress Crusade, 51 DUKE LJ. 435, 46263 (2001) (calling attention to the Court's aggressive efforts to strike down federal
statutes, while remaining "somewhat middle-<>f-the-road on divisive social policy");
Neal Devins, Congress and the Making of the Second Rehnquist Court, 47 ST. LOUIS U. LJ.
773, 774-76 (2003) (arguing that the Rehnquist Court, in general, and Justices
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for example, the Court's federalism revival. Why did the Court limit
Congress' power based on federalism principles, and why did it wait
until 1995 to begin its revival? What prompted the Court to extend its
somewhat ambiguous initial rulings into bolder statements about the
limits of Congress' power? Why has the Court excluded race and
gender from its Fourteenth Amendment, Section Five revolution? In
answering these questions, it is useful to look to the majoritarian influences that shape the Justices' understanding of Congress and their
power to limit Congress. Majoritarian forces that have given the
Court both reason and incentive to limit Congress include the (then)
ever-growing populist distrust of big government, the increasing willingness of candidates to embrace anti-Congress rhetoric, the Contract
with America-spurred 1994 Republican takeover of Congress, the unwillingness of members of Congress to take issue with or even discuss
Supreme Court decisions limiting federal powers, and the failure of
interest groups to feel sufficiently threatened by the Court's anti28
Congress decisions to mobilize in opposition to them.
Social and political forces, especially Congress' support of civil
and abortion rights, have also figured prominently in Rehnquist Court
rulings on social issues. Unlike its federalism revival (where a coalition of five Justices joined forces to limit Congress' power), Justices
Kennedy and O'Connor have refused to sign onto the conservative social agenda. Their refusal is almost certainly tied to majoritarian signals sent to the Court. From 1981-1992, for example, the Reagan and
Bush administrations sought to reshape constitutional law through ju2
dicial appointments and Justice Department arguments. !' These efforts, however, were strongly resisted by Congress, interest groups, and

O'Connor and Kennedy, in particular, consider social and political forces when making decisions).
28
I do not mean to suggest that lawmakers and the American people are pushing
the Court to invalidate federal statutes. My point, instead, is that the Court's rulings
are consistent with social and political forces. In addition to my writings on the subject, see Barry Friedman & Anna L. Harvey, Electing the Supreme Court, 78 IND. LJ. 123,
125 (2003) for the argument that the current Congress is generally sympathetic to
Court decisions constraining lawmaker powers; Christopher H. Schroeder, Causes of the
Recent Tum in Constitutional Interpretation, 51 DUKE LJ. 307, 334-51 (2001) for the assertion that anti-Congress public opinion helps explain federalism decisions; Keith E.
Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the Court's Federalism Offensive, 51
DUKE LJ. 477 (2001) for the proposition that the Court has taken advantage of lawmaker and interest group disinterest in Court decision making.
29
See infra text accompanying notes 38-42, 56-58 (describing Justice Department
arguments against affirmative action).
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elites (especially academics and joumalists). ° For Justices Kennedy
and O'Connor, battles between the White House, Congress, and other
interests called attention to the costs of embracing the social conservative agenda. Starting in 1994, O'Connor and Kennedy often opposed
31
granting certiorari in these cases, pushing the Court away from con32
tentious social issues and towards less controversial federalism cases.
More telling, some of their opinions refer to social and political forces
33
in explaining why the Court cannot embrace conservative objectives.
34
The best known example of this is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. By
reaffirming Roe, the Casey plurality (O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter) validated Senate Judiciary Committee efforts to preserve a constitutional
right to abortion. By turning down Robert Bork's nomination and by
making Roe the focus of subsequent confirmation hearings, the Senate
made "clear to [Supreme Court] nominees that a willingness to profess belief in some threshold constitutional values is a prerequisite for
35
the job." Even more telling, by rejecting Bork, the Senate paved the
way for the appointment of Justices Kennedy and Souter, both of
whom lack strong ties to conservative interests and have often resisted
36
the conservative social agenda. Finally, to the extent that the Senate
3

30

See, e.g., David Johnston, Facing His Term's End, Barr Defends His Record, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 23, 1992, at A13 (describing Congressional criticism of the Justice Department in terms of "an agency that drove the Republicans' conservative legal agenda
for a dozen years"); Editorial, A 'Blueprint' All Right-For Segregation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1,
1984, at A26 (criticizing the Reagan administration's plan for ending mandatory busing as a blueprint for school segregation); see also Schwartz, infra note 46, at 525 n.ll
(noting positive press reactions for Supreme Court support for affirmative action).
31
See Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary
Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 569, 637 (2003) (describing O'Connor's and Kennedy's
reluctance to hear cases concerning social issues due to their "reputational costs" for
the Court).
32
See id. at 581 (charting dramatic differences in balance between social issue and
federalism cases before and after 1995). Before its 2002-2003 term, moreover, the
Court broke relatively little doctrinal ground on social issue cases. See id. at 581-84
(discussing the Court's decisions to maintain previous doctrine on abortion, school
prayer, and, to some extent, affirmative action). This is not to say that the second
Rehnquist Court has steered clear of all cases raising contentious social issues. While it
has been relatively less active than the first Rehnquist Court, the second Rehnquist
Court has issued several significant rulings on cases implicating the conservative social
agenda.
33
See infra notes 65-71 (providing examples of these opinions); see also Lawrence
v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (linking the Court's rejection of same-sex sodomy statute with changing social attitudes towards gay rights).
34
505 u.s. 833 ( 1992)
35
Stephen J. Wermiel, Confirming the Constitution: The Role of the Senate judiciary
Committee, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 121, 121-22 (1993).
36
Kennedy, of course, filled the seat that Bork would have occupied. Souter (who
0
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is a barometer of interest group and populist sentiment, Bork and
subsequent confirmation battles made clear that the vigorous pursuit
of social conservative causes would spill over to elections and otherwise fuel the ongoing culture wars. In this way, lawmakers signaled to
the Court that the pursuit of social conservative objectives would come
at a price, such as legislation overturning Court rulings and the rejection of conservative nominees. The Casey plurality took these social
and political forces into account. Emphasizing the costs of "overrul [in g) under [political] fire" and linking the Court's "legitimacy" to
37
the "people's confidence in the Judiciary," the Casey plurality tied
their refusal to do the bidding of the President who appointed them
to the Court's "legitimacy."
On civil rights, Rehnquist Court decision making also reflects majoritarian forces. Consider the following: the Reagan administration
succeeded in only 43% of the Supreme Court cases it participated in
(as compared to the Solicitor General office's average success rate of
70%). In sharp contrast, the Court agreed with Clinton administra38
tion filings 74% of the time. In other words, the conservative arguments of the Reagan administration were far less successful with the
Rehnquist Court than the more liberal arguments of the Clinton administration. Social and political forces figure prominently in understanding the relative success rates of the Reagan and Clinton administrations. In particular, inept policymaking and a lack of political
resolve plagued Reagan administration efforts to narrow civil rights
protections and eviscerate affirmative action.
Witness the Reagan Justice Department's failed campaign against
affirmative action. By condemning those who "worship at the altar of
39
forced busing and mandatory quotas" and calling racial preferences

had no paper trail) was appointed, in part, to avoid the kind of confirmation battle
that was fought over the Bork nomination . It is also noteworthy that Ronald Reagan's
detem1ination to appoint the first woman to the Supreme Court resulted in the nomination of Sandra Day O ' Connor. In other words, unlike Bork, Scalia, Thomas, and
Rehnquist (who was elevated by Reagan), the social conservative agenda gave way to
other values when Kennedy, Souter, and O 'Co nnor were appointed to the Court.
37
Casey, 505 U.S. at 867. For Mike Paulsen, the Casey plurality's focus on politics,
not law, makes it "the worst constitutional decision of the United Supreme Court of all
time." Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 995, 1001-02 (2003).
38
See Merrill, supra note 31, at 622-28 (comparing the success rate of Reagan administration in twenty-two 1986-1988 decisions to Clinton administration in twentythree 1997-1999 decisions).
39
Steven R. Weisman, Reagan Strongly Defends Policies on Minority and Women's
Rights, N .Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1983, at Al.
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"(just as] offensive to standards of human decency today as [they
40
were] some 84 years ago when countenanced under Plessy v. Ferguson,"
Reagan and his Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, Brad Reynolds, launched a morally and rhetorically divisive campaign against
preferences. But this absolutist campaign against preferences met stiff
resistance from Congress, interest groups, state and local officials, big
business, the media, and, ultimately, the courts.
For example, when the Justice Department asked states and localities to join it in challenging longstanding affirmative action consent
decrees, mayors and governors almost always criticized the Department (and lower court judges uniformly turned down the Depart41
ment's efforts). More significantly, in 1989, the Reagan administration galvanized Congress and civil rights groups by trying to restore
tax breaks to racially discriminatory private schools and by opposing
bipartisan efforts to make disparate racial impact an important evi42
dentiary tool in voting rights cases. The power of civil rights groups
was on full display during the battle over Robert Bork's nomination to
the Supreme Court. Senate Judiciary Committee chair Joseph Biden
"plotted strategy" with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Leadership
43
Conference on Civil Rights, and other civil rights groups.
Congress also took aim at Reagan administration affirmative ac44
tion initiatives. By enacting legislation, holding oversight hearings,
and turning down nominees who opposed affirmative action (including the nomination of Brad Reynolds to be Associate Attorney General),45 Congress communicated its continuing support of existing
40

Oversight Hearings on Equal Employment opportunity and Affirmative Action: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on t.mployment opportunities of the Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 137 (1981) (statement of William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights).
41
See CHARLES FRIED, ORDER Ai'ID LAw 109-10 (1991) (recounting one of Reynolds' failed attempts to force modifications of local consent decrees relating to seniority systems); Stephen Engelberg, Attack on Quotas opposed by Cities, N.Y. TIMES, May 4,
1985, at Al ("In New York, New Jersey, Miami, Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia and San
Francisco, officials said in interviews that they opposed the Administration's effort to
eliminate quotas for hiring blacks, Hispanic-Americans and women.").
42
See Neal Devins, The Civil Rights Hydra, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1723, 1755-56 (1991)
(arguing that these "policy blunders" contributed to the lack of a centralized effort by
the Reagan administration on civil rights).
43
TERRY EASTLAND, ENERGY IN THE EXECUTIVE 246-4 7 ( 1992).
44 See, e.g., Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202 (1987) (highlighting
Con~ress' legislative opposition to Reagan's stance on affirmative action).
"See Howard Kurtz, Reynolds' Nomination Voted Down, WASH. POST,June 28, 1985,
at AI (describing Congress' "stunning rejection of [Reynolds,] the chief architect of
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affirmative action programs. For their part, the press and big business
strongly backed affirmative action. Twenty of twenty-one "top papers"
rejected Reagan Justice Department efforts to dismantle affirmative
46
action. Big business has also been a consistent supporter of affirmative action. For reasons ranging from avoiding costly lawsuits to improving a company's public image to increasing productivity,
47
"[b] usinessmen like to hire by the numbers. "
By 1986, the year Rehnquist became ChiefJustice, the Reagan Justice Department's campaign against affirmative action lay in shambles.
Unable to tap into populist disapproval of racial quotas, Justice Department attacks on racial preferences were portrayed as insensitive
48
and mean spirited. Rebukes by Congress, interest groups, and the
press reinforced the desire of most department and agency heads to
49
leave in place existing affirmative action programs. Even the White
House distanced itself from the Justice Department's campaign against
affirmative action. Refusing to undo an executive order requiring
325,000 government contractors to adopt affirmative action plans, the
President preferred speaking about his administration "strongly support[ing]" programs that "provide special assistance to minority businesses."50 Consistent with these social and political forces, the Supreme
the Reagan administration's civil rights policies").
46
See Herman Schwartz, The 1986 and 1987 Affinnative Action Cases: It's All Over But
the Shouting, 86 MICH. L. REv. 524, 525 n.11 (1987) (surveying the positive reactions of
newspapers to the Supreme Court's rejection of Justice Department arguments in
Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986), the 1986 affirmative action decision
barring layoffs of senior non-minority employees).
47
Anne B. Fisher, Businessmen Like to Hire by the Numbers, FORTUNE, Sept. 16, 1985,
at 26 ("[P]ersuasive evidence indicates that most large American corporations want to
retain their affirmative action programs, numerical goals and all."). See also PETER H.
SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE DISTANCE 172-73
(2003) (describing corporate support for affirmative action to avoid adverse publicity).
48
See supra note 30, 41-43 and accompanying text (describing the resistance to the
attmepts by the Reagan and first Bush adminstrations to advance a conservative social
agenda).
49
See Devins supra note 42, at 1752-58 (providing specific examples of the efforts
by civil rights groups to limit the Justice Department's attempts to diminish affirmative
action).
50
President's Remarks to Members of the National Association of Minority Contractors, 20 WEEKLYCOMP. PRES. Doc. 946,949 (June 27, 1984). The Reagan administration's campaign against affirmative action, ultimately, was quite modest-limited to
the Justice Department and a handful of agencies. See Devins, supra note 42, at 175258 (describing Reagan's uncoordinated and ultimately moderate civil rights policy).
Consequently, social conservatives accused the administration of being two-faced, of
"wring[ing] what[ever] partisan advantage it [could] from the pattern of racial and
ethnic spoils established in the 1970s." Jeremy Rabkin, Reagan's Secret Quotas, NEW
REPUBLIC, Aug. 5, 1985, at 15, 17.
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Court rejected the Department's claim that all preferences were immoral and illegal. Initially, the Burger Court approved a range of hiring and promotion schemes that benefited racial minorities and
5I
women.
The Rehnquist Court, undoubtedly aware of the political maelstrom surrounding affirmative action, largely followed its predecessor's lead. Its initial constitutional rulings were a mixed bag. In 1987,
it ruled, in United States v. Paradise, that a requirement of one Mrican
American for one white promotion is a constitutionally permissible
52
remedy. In 1989, it concluded in City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.
53
that state affirmative action plans are subject to strict scrutiny review.
The very next year, however, it ruled that federal affirmative action
plans are subject to mid-tier review.
4
This ruling, lvfetro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,5 is especially instructive
in understanding the linkage between majoritarian forces and the
Court's affirmative action jurisprudence. By filing an amicus brief in
the litigation and, more importantly, enacting legislation blocking
Reagan FCC reconsideration of diversity preferences, Congress em55
braced these affirmative-action programs. The first Bush administration also signaled its support of these preferences, albeit in a less clear
way. Following the lead of the Reagan administration, the Bush Jus56
tice Department formally opposed affirmative action. However, the
51

Even when ruling against affirmative action (as it did in Wygant, 476 U.S. 267),
the Court rejected Justice Department efforts to limit affirmative action to the actual
victims of discrimination and, in so doing, handed a "significant victory [to] civil rights
groups." Al Kamen, High Court Ruling Signals Suppart for Affirmative Action: Groups See
Victory in Teachers' Case, WASH. POST, May 20, 1986, at AI (discussing the Wygant opinions which "showed a strong majority [of the court] in favor of affirmative action, in
general, and in agreement on 'central core principles."'). For an overview of Reaganera Supreme Court decision making, see Neal Devins, Affirmative Action After Reagan, 68
TEX. L. REV. 353, 360-78 (1989); Schwartz, supra note 46, at 527-37.
52
480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (holding that the "one-for-one promotion requirement was narrowly tailored to serve its several purposes."). Also in 1987, the Court refused to consider constitutional issues when approving-{)n statutory grounds-an affirmative action plan that granted preferences to women seeking promotions . .Johnson
v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 620 n.2 (1987).
53
488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (stating that the purpose of strict scrutiny is to insure
that racial classifications are only used to pursue important governmental interests). For
a discussion of statutory decisions issued in 1989, see supra text accompanying note 42.
54
497 U.S. 547 (1990) (holding that FCC affirmative action policies were substantially related to achieving broadcast diversity).
55
See Neal Devins, Congress, the FCC, and the Search for the Public Trustee, 56 LAW &
COl\'TEMP. PROBS. 145, 176-78 (1993) (discussing Congress' actions to limit FCC reexamination of diversity preferences and arguments in favor of such preferences in Metro).
56
See id. at 177-78 (describing the Justice Department's characterization of racial
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President also facilitated the vigorous defense of racial preferences in
Metro by appointing three FCC Commissioners who strongly favored
diversity preferences and promised to defend those preferences in
57
court. Also, rather than have the Solicitor General (who is statutorily
authorized to control FCC Supreme Court litigation) block the FCC
from defending diversity preferences, the administration authorized
8
the FCC to represent itself before the Supreme Court.'' Finally, Bush
distanced himselffrom Reagan justice Department policies. Two weeks
after his inauguration, he expressed disappointment with the Court's
just-issued Croson decision, speaking of his "commit[ment] to affirma59
tive action" and his support for a narrow reading of the decision.
Elected govemment officials signaled their support for minority
interests in other important ways during the Bush years. By commissioning "disparity studies" that supported claims of continuing discrimination in public contracting, states and municipalities were able
60
to minimize Croson's impact. Even more significantly, the bitter battle over Clarence Thomas's Supreme Court nomination underscored
opposition to the social conservative agenda by powerful civil rights
interests and their supporters in Congress. Additionally, after officials
in the Department of Education questioned the constitutionality of
government-funded minority scholarships, the President made clear
that he disagreed with this interpretation, stating that the question
61
was one "for the courts to rule on." Finally, Bush signed on to lawmaker efforts to invalidate the Rehnquist Court's earlier restrictive

preferences in Metro as "precisely the type of racial stereotyping that is anathema to
basic constitutional principles").
57
ld. at 177.
58
See id. at 178 (noting that the Solicitor General "allowed the FCC to serve as the
government's principle voice in the case."). The Bush justice Department did file an
amicus brief opposing racial preferences. For additional discussion about the Bush
administration's possible reasons for adopting these conflicting courses of action, see
id. at 177-78.
59
The President's News Conference, 1 PUB. PAPERS 21, 29 Uan. 27, 1989).
60
See Dorothy J. Gaiter, Court Ruling Makes Discrimination Studies a Hot New Industry,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 1993, at Al (describing the city of Miami's reaction to disparity
studies conducted as a result of the Croson decision); George R. La Noue, Social Science
and Minority "Set-Asides", IlO PUB. INT., Winter 1993, at 49, 61 ("Above all, it is the disparity studies themselves that are proving to be the greatest impediment to implementing Croson. No matter how poorly done, a several-hundred-page disparity study 'proving discrimination' will quiet critics in the political and business community just by its
existence.").
61
Karen De Witt, U.S. Eases College Aid Stand, But Not All the Way, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
19,1990, atAl.
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62

readings of civil rights statutes. By overruling six of these Rehnquist
Court decisions, the resulting statute, the 1991 Civil Rights Act, "was
designed to be, and was, a massive rebuke to the Court."fi3
Against this backdrop, unsurprisingly, the Rehnquist Court shifted
its energies away from affirmative action and other social issues and
toward federalism. By denying certiorari to most cases involving divisive social issues, more liberal Justices who feared conservative outcomes teamed with swing Justices (like O'Connor and Kennedy) who
64
are not strongly committed to the conservative social agenda. From
its Metro Broadcasting decision in 1990 until Grutter was decided in the
spring of 2003, the Court issued only one substantive ruling on the con5
stitutionality of affirmative action: Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peiia.fi
Recognizing that the pursuit of socially conservative objectives
66
would come at a high price, the Court broke little doctrinal ground.
During the Reagan and Bush years, the Court's decision making on

62

See Neal Devins, Reagan Redux: Civil Rights Under Bush, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
955, 990-99 (1993) (calling attention to reports that Bush '"strongly expressed' ... his
desire to sign the bill"). When the bill was first passed by Congress, Bush depicted the
legislation as a "quota bill" and vetoed it. But a compromise was reached, in large part,
because Bush pressured his negotiators to meet with civil rights leaders and find a way
for him to sign the bill. ld.
63
Merrill, supra note 31, at 631.
64
ld. at 637 (speculating that O 'Connor and Kennedy may be more concerned
about reputational costs than furthering the conservative social agenda).
65
515 U .S. 200 (1995) (applying a strict scrutiny analysis to government contracts).
In 1993 and 2000, the Court issued decisions on the justiciability of affirmative-action
lawsuits. In 1993, the Court ruled that a construction contractor's association had
standing to challenge a city ordinance setting aside ten percent of city contracts for
minority businesses. This decision, Northeastern Florida Chapter of Associate General Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, reaffirmed the Court's jurisdictional ruling in Bakke.
508 U.S. 656, 665-68 (1993) (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280-81 n.14 (1978)) . Then in
2000, the Court concluded that Colorado could not moot a follow-up to Adarand by
modifying its affirmative action program. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S.
216 (2000) .
The Rehnquist Court had also agreed to hear another follow-up to Adarand; at the
urging of the second Bush administration, however, it dismissed the case as "improvidently granted." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001) . The
Court also agreed to decide whether employment discrimination statutes allow a
school board to consider race when terminating a teacher. This case, Piscataway Township Board of .Caucation v. Taxman, was dismissed after a coalition of civil rights interest
groups joined together to settle the case with the teacher who filed the lawsuit. 522
U.S. 1010 (1997), cert. dismissed.
66
See supra text accompanying notes 41-51 (describing the contentious struggle
between the Reagan and first Bush administration , and those civil rights ' groups and
like minded public officials over attempts to limit the scope of affirmative action)) .
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affirmative action was indeterminate and often unintelligible.
The
68
Court's sole Clinton-era decision, Adarand, followed this pattern. On
the one hand, the Court overruled Metro Broadcasting by concluding
that federal affirmative action programs are subject to strict scrutiny
69
review. At the same time, Adarand referred to the "unhappy persistence" of race discrimination and the power of the government to act
70
"in response to it." By ruling in this way, the Court sought to "dispel
71
the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact."'
Moreover, by refusing to rule on the constitutionality of the federal
affirmative action plan in Adarand, the Court was quickly (and correctly) dismissed as "very nearly beside the point" and "insignifican[t]"
72
because it "settled nothing."
Furthermore, the Court's refusal to
hear numerous post-Adarand challenges to affirmative action in public
education gave state and federal officials free reign to sort out the
73
constitutionality of affirmative action.

67

See supra text accompanying notes 52-54 (describing the Court's incongruous
rulinJs during the Reagan and first Bush administrations).
515 U.S. at 200.
69
fd. at 227.
70
fd. at 262 n.l6.
71
Id. at 237.
72
Linda Greenhouse, In Step on Racial Policy, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1995, at AI (suggesting that the Court's decision was "very nearly beside the point" because the fate of
affirmative action will ultimately be decided in the political arena); Charles
Krauthammer, Affirmative Action: Settle it Out of Court, WASH. POST, June 16, 1995, at
A25 (asserting the "relative insignificance" of the Court's decision); George F. Will,
Affirmative Action: The Court's Murky Ruling, WASH. POST, June 14, 1995, at A25 (contending that the Adarand decision "settled nothing").
73
See Lyle Denniston & Patrick Healy, Supreme Court to Weigh Race in Admissions,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 3, 2002, at AI (describing the conflicting opinions of lower courts
regarding the constitutionality of affirmative action). On voting rights, however, the
Rehnquist Court issued several significant rulings during this period. From 1993 to
2003, the Court issued eight decisions concerning the constitutionality of raceconscious redistricting. For the most part, these decisions follow claims made in this
essay about the pivotal role that social and political forces play in explaining Rehnquist
Court decision making. To start, the Court's initial foray into voting rights occurred
during the first Rehnquist Court (1986-1994). See supra text accompanying notes 3132 (discussing the differences between the first and second Rehnquist Courts, especially the first Rehnquist Court's willingness to resolve contentious social issues). That
decision, Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), cast doubt on the constitutionality of voting rights legislation that encouraged states to create voting districts in which a majority of voters were racial minorities. The scope of Shaw was expanded in Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1998), which held that race could not "subordinated
traditional race-neutral districting principles . . . to racial considerations." Subsequently, however, the Court has largely bowed to those social and political forces that
helped propel bipartisan support for race-conscious redistricting legislation. In particular, recognizing that racial minorities often vote for democratic candidates, the

HeinOnline -- 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 361 2003-2004

362

UNIVERSITY OF PANNSYL VANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 152: 347

Eight years after Adarand, the Supreme Court reentered the fray
with Grutter. As the next Part of this essay will detail, Grutter, like prior
Rehnquist Court decisions on affirmative action, conformed to social
and political forces. These forces have always supported affirmative
action. Consequently, just as the Rehnquist Court responded to majoritarian pressures by rejecting the social conservative agenda in the
years before its federalism revolution, the Court in Grutter once again
issued a decision that echoed the pressures beating against it.

II.

EXPLAINING GRU7Tt,'R V. BOLLINGER

By linking Rehnquist Court affirmative-action decisions to the social and political forces influencing the Court, the prior Part underscores the pivotal role that m~oritarian influences play in Supreme
Court decision making. This Part will focus on the Court's recent approval of affirmative action in Grutter. Initially, it will track the ongoing support for affirmative action by elected officials and other interest groups, starting with elected government's response to Adarand
and culminating in the Grutter litigation. Following this examination
of majoritarian influences, it will discuss the ways in which social and
political forces seem to have impacted on the outcome and reasoning
of both Grutter and Gratz.

*

*

*

In the years following Adarand, federal and state officials condemned race quotas but continued to support affirmative action. Although Clinton repudiated both proportionate representation of mi4
norities in Congress and overly rigid preference plans/ he argued
75
that Adarand "actually reaffirmed the need for affirmative action."
Through a White House-conducted affirmative-action review, the

Court has concluded that lawmakers-when drawing district lines-can pay attention
to race in order to advance political objectives. Easley v. Cromartie, 592 U.S. 1076
(2001).
74
Clinton withdrew his nomination of Lani Gunier to head the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division for precisely this reason (although Democratic lawmakers'
complaints about Gunier's writings certainly figured into his calculus). Neil A. Le\vis,
Clinton Abandons His Nominee for Rights Post Amid opposition, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1993, at
A1 (noting that Clinton "could not defend many of her views on bolstering the political power of blacks").
75
Remarks on Affirmative Action at the National Archives and Records Administration, II PUB. PAPERS,July 19, 1995, 1112.
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Clinton administration concluded that nearly all affirmative-action
programs are responsive to discrimination, do not unduly burden
non-minorities, and accomplish their objectives of increasing oppor75
tunities for minorities and women.
The Clinton administration,
moreover, resisted a Fifth Circuit ruling prohibiting affirmative action
in higher education. The Justice Department asked the Supreme
Court to reverse the decision and the Department of Education considered rescinding federal funds given to schools that eliminated af77
firmative action programs.
For its part, the pre-Grutter George W. Bush administration had
signaled its qualified support of affirmative action. Even though Bush
ran on an anti-preference platform, he campaigned in Mrican American communities, stated that racial progress was "still too slow," and
"went to the NAACP convention and apologized for [the Republican
78
party's] mistakes on civil rights."
Once in office, he assembled a
79
cabinet "every bit as diverse as former President Clinton's."
Bush
also reached out to minority voters by pursuing policy initiatives on
voter fraud and racial profiling, as well as reappointing two Mrican
American judges (initially picked by Clinton) whose nominations the
80
Republican Senate had stalled. In August 2001, the administration
76

See Ann Devroy, Clinton Study Backs Affirmative Action: Five-Month Reviw Supports
Some Reforms, WASH. POST, July 19, 1995, at A1 (summarizing the administration's conclusion that the "vast majority" of affirmative action programs were beneficial and
should continue). Immediately after Adarand, government agencies were told that,
"[n]o affirmative action program should be suspended prior to" an evaluation of the
program's constitutionality. Legal Guidance on the Implications of the Supreme Court's Decision inAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peiia, 19 Op. Off. Legal Counsel171, 202 (1995);
see also Alan J. Meese, Bakke Betrayed, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 479, 482 (2000)
(suggesting that the Clinton administration advanced its affirmative action agenda by,
among other things, misreading Bakke).
77
See Peter Applebome, Texas is Told to Keep Affirmative Action in Universities or Risk
Losing Federal Aid, N.Y. TIMES, March 26, 1997, at B11 (discussing the Departmenl of
Education's warning to Texas to keep affirmative-action provisions in place or risk losing federal funding); Ann Devroy, Affirmative Action Rules are Revised, WASH. POST, May
23, 1996, at Al (reporting that the Justice Department was preparing to file a brief
supporting efforts to overturn the Texas ruling barring affirmative action in higher
education). But see Peter Applebome, In Shift, US. Tells Texas It Can't Ignore Ruling Barring Bias in College Admissions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1997, at A20 (describing the Department of Education's reversal and subsequent mandate that Texas ban the use of
racial preferences in admissions and scholarships).
78
JEREMY D. MAYER, RUNNING ON RACE 281, 284 (2002).
79
Jim VandeHei, Extending Diversity to Bush Subcabinet will be Tough Task, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 6, 2001, atA20.
80
See Editorial, Bush and the Black Agenda, CHRISTIAl'-1 SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 7, 2001,
at 8 (describing Bush's steps to confront Mrican American disillusionment with presidential policy).

HeinOnline -- 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 363 2003-2004

364

UNIVERSITY OFPl!-'NNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 152: 347

agreed to defend the constitutionality of a federal affirmative-action
81
program before the Supreme Court.
Congress has also backed affirmative action. For example, following the 1994 Republican takeover of Congress, several key Republican
leaders tried to move affirmative action off the legislative schedule.
Correspondingly, motivated both by a desire "to craft a positive message for minorities" and a corresponding fear that a fight over affirmative action would delay their pursuit of the Contract with America reforms,82 Republicans in the House and Senate voted down proposals
83
to roll back federal affirmative-action programs. A bill targeting racial preferences in higher education, for example, was soundly defeated because "'a majority of the Republican Conference realize[d]
that the GOP would lose popular electoral support when it sup84
port[ed] anti-affirmative action measures." Indeed, with new census
data suggesting that Republicans need to attract the growing number
of working women and Hispanic voters, Republican lawmakers are
85
more likely today than ever before to support affirmative action.
State support for affirmative action, with few exceptions, has also
been steadfast. Although voters in California and Washington, in
1996 and 1998, respectively, amended their state constitutions to ban
86
racial preferences, the populist revolts against affirmative action

81

Edward Walsh, Bush Backs Minority Program: High Court Brief Defends DOT Contracting Plan, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 200I, at AI (reporting on the Bush administration
brief defending the constitutionality of an affirmative action program).
82
Senator John McCain, for example, argued that the costs of repudiating affirmative action were too great for his party, when he stated that "the danger exists that
our [party's] aspirations and intentions will be misperceived, dividing our country and
harming our party." 144 CONG. REc. SI490 (I998).
83
See James Dao, Senate Stops Bid to End Road-Work Set-Asides, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 7,
I998, at A9 (detailing the Senate rejection of an effort to end a federal program that
set aside ten percent of highway contracts for minorities); Kevin Merida, Senate Rejects
Gramm Bid to Bar Affirmative Action Set Asides, WASH. POST, July 2I, 1995, at AI3 (noting
that the Gramm vote was defeated by a 6I to 36 vote). Cf Gerald F. Seib, GOP Congress
Debates an Attack on Affirmative Action, WALL ST.]., Dec. 10, I996, at A24 (summarizing
Republican hesitancy about supporting Proposition 209, an anti-affirmative action initiative).
84
Juliet Eilperin, House Defeats Bill Targeting College Affirmative Action, WASH. POST,
May 7, I 998, at A4 (quoting Rep. Henry Bonilla).
85
See Thomas B. Edsall, Census a Clarion Call for Democrats, GOP. As Nation Changes,
Parties are Warned They Need New Tactics to Woo Voters, WASH. POST, July 8, 200I, at A5
(discussing Republican recognition that "the electorate is moving steadily to the left"
and they need "to adopt new rhetoric and tactics to attract minority voters" to maintain
leadership).
86
See Alex Fryer, Affirmative Action fight Shifts from Ballot Box to Courtroom, SEATTLE
TIMES, Nov. 25, 2002, at AI (discussing the movements in Washington and California
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largely had fizzled by the end of the 1990s. Further, state officials, in87
cluding Republican governors, typically opposed these initiatives.
Mter a 1996 backlash against the California anti-affirmative action initiative resulted in a Republican party loss of majority control of the
88
state Assembly, Republican lawmakers vigorously and successfully
89
opposed similar ballot initiatives.
Anti-preference interests responded to this rebuke by turning their attention to the courts (at
least before Grutter).
By the time the Supreme Court agreed to hear Grutter and Gratz,
state and federal support for affirmative action was stronger than ever.
For this reason, there was little prospect of the Court embracing the
same anti-affirmative action arguments that it rejected during the
Reagan and first Bush administrations. Instead, given the Court's
propensity to act within the constraints of majoritarian influences, the
question was not whether the Court would disavow affirmative action,
but whether it would meaningfully limit the power of colleges and
universities to make race-based admissions decisions. For example,
the Court could have demanded that schools first pursue race-neutral
schemes before resorting to race-conscious ones. Similarly, the Court
could have found that a school's pursuit of a "critical mass" of disad90
vantaged minorities was tantamount to a quota. "Vith elected offi-

to "prohibit public agencies from considering race and gender in hiring, public-works
construction, and school admissions).
87
See Davis S. Broder & Robert A. Barnes, Few Governors join Attack on Racial Politics,
WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 1995, at A1 (describing how the backlash against affirmative action has gained support from few governors).
88
Fryer, supra note 86, at A1 (noting the anti-affirmative action campaign alienated minority voters). Ironically, former California Governor Pete Wilson made his
opposition to affirmative action a centerpiece of his 1996 bid for the Republican presidential nomination. Paul Taylor, Wilson }"'ormally joins Presidential Race, WASH. POST,
Aug. 29, 1995, at AS (describing Wilson's plan to make affirmative action a central issue in his campaign).
89
Fryer, supra note 86, at AI ("Republicans across the nation are largely following
the lead of President Bush, who has largely avoided the affirmative-action issue."). In
Florida, lawyers for Governor Jeb Bush, claiming that a proposed affirmative action
initiative violated state law, went to court to block it. Jackie Hallifax, Connerly Petitions
Argued, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 7, 2000, at SB. By opposing affirmative action in higher
education, however, Jeb Bush energized minority voters-so much so that a dramatic
increase in minority voter turnout in the 2000 presidential election nearly cost his
brother the \\'hite House. See MAYER, supra note 78, at 289 (concluding that "[w]ithout
that surge in black support for Gore, Bush would have won Florida [and thus, the
\\'bite House] without the help of the Supreme Court").
90
This was the conclusion reached by the federal district court judge hearing the
Michigan law school case. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 851 (2001)
("[B]y using race to ensure the enrollment of a certain minimum percentage of un-
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cials opposing quotas and opinion polls showing popular opposition
to racial preferences in college admissions (despite a poll showing
that eighty percent of Americans also think it important for colleges
91
to have "a racially diverse student body"), proponents of affirmative
action had reason to fear the Court would approve affirmative action
but narrow the ways in which schools could consider race.
During the course of the Grutter litigation, proponents' fears gave
way to a growing recognition that social and political pressures
strongly favored Supreme Court approval of preferential admissions
policies. In addition to overwhelming support by government and interest group amici, developments outside the Court highlighted the
costs of a Court decision invalidating or severely limiting preferences.92 In other words, notwithstanding the fact that most Americans
oppose race-conscious admissions, majoritarian forces weighed heavily
in favor of the Rehnquist Court's approval of affirmative action.

*

*

*

Social and political forces beating against the Court in the Grutter
and Gratz cases include the amicus filings by both interest groups and
lawmakers, the Bush administration's decision to embrace racial diversity as an important and legitimate governmental end, the continuing salience of race discrimination in judicial confirmation politics,
the ouster of Senate majority leader Trent Lott for making racially insensitive comments, and the awareness of the difficulties of implementing a Court ruling barring or severely limiting race-conscious
admissions. In the pages that follow, this Essay will examine each of
these factors.
A. Amicus filings

One hundred two amicus briefs were filed in Grutter and Gratzeighty-three supporting the University of Michigan and nineteen supporting the petitioners. The gap between supporters and opponents
derrepresented minority students ... the current admissions policy [is] practically indistinguishable from a quota system.").
91 Charles Lane, Polls: Americans Say Court is 'About Right,' WASH. POST, July 7,
2003, at Al5. Likewise, most Americans oppose preferences while supporting "affirmative action." Gary Langer, Assistance, But Not Pre[lffence Poll: Most Share Bush s View on
Affirmative Action Analysis, available at http:/ /www.abcnews.com (Jan. 27, 2003).
92
See infra text accompanying notes 110-17 (describing the political developments
that caused the Bush administration's embrace of racial diversity in higher education).
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of affirmative action, however, was far more lopsided than this four-toone ratio. Consider the following: no member of Congress opposed
the University. Indeed, one hundred twenty-four members of the
House and thirteen Senators joined four briefs supporting the university, which emphasized that the federal government had repeatedly
endorsed race-conscious decision making as constitutional, and argued that the Court should give deference to the constitutionally sig93
nificant opinions of the other branches.
Though all brief signers
were Democrats, four moderate Republicans made public their support of the university. In a letter to President Bush, Senators Lincoln
Chafee, Olympia Snowe, Susan Collins, and Arlen Specter urged the
administration to "support the position that diversity is a compelling
94
government interest."
States also rallied behind the University. Unlike earlier challenges
to the constitutionality of state-sponsored affirmative action (where
95
states typically did not file briefs), twenty-three states and the Virgin
96
Islands joined one of three briefs supporting the university. These
briefs argued that the university's determination that a diverse student
body is a compelling interest that "falls within the institutional autonomy afforded to universities . . . and should, therefore, be afforded
deference.',97 Only one state, Florida, filed a brief supporting the peti-

93

Brief of Amici Curiae John Conyers, Jr., Member of Congress et al. at 24, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) & Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003)
(Nos. 02-241 & 02-516); Brief of Amici Curiae Senators Thomas Daschle et al, at 22,
Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) & Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003)
(Nos. 02-241 & 02-516).
94
Letter from Senator Arlen Specter et al. to President Bush (Jan. 14, 2003),
available at http:/ /www.senate.gov/ -specter /index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.
Detail&PressRelease_id=329&Month=1&Year=2003; see also Dana Milbank, Bush's Conservative Policies Put Some Moderates on Edge, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2003, at AS (mentioning the moderate Republican's letter).
95
In Bakke, no state filed an amicus brief. In M)•gant, one amicus brief was filed on
behalf of six states. Brief of Amici Curiae of the State of Minnesota et al. at l, Wygant
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1985) (No. 84-1340). In Croson, two briefs
were filed on behalf of sixteen states and the District of Columbia. Brief of Amici Curiae of the State of New York et al. at 1, City of Richmond v. Croson, l 09 S. Ct. 706
(1988) (No. 87-998); Brief of Amicus Curiae of the State of Maryland at 1, City of
Richmond v. Croson, 109 S. Ct. 706 (1988) (No. 87-998).
96
California and Washington, the two states bound by citizen initiatives prohibiting racial preferences joined these briefs. Brief of Amici Curiae of the State of Maryland et al. at 5, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) & Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S.
Ct. 2411 (2003) (Nos. 02-241 & 02-516).
97
Brief of Amicus Curiae Michigan Governor Jennifer M. Granholm at 5, Grutter
v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) & Gratz v. Bollinger 123 S. Ct. 241 1 (2003) (Nos.
02-241 & 02-516); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae State of Maryland, supm note 96, at 5,
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tioner. In it, Florida argues that diversity can be pursued without racial preferences, and points to its own experiences with a race-neutral
admissions scheme, which includes a program whereby the top twenty
percent of high school seniors are guaranteed admission to state uni98
versities.
Big-business, labor, education, and civil-rights interests also
backed the university. While these interests had all embraced the
constitutionality of racial preferences prior to the Michigan cases,
support for the Michigan plans was more emphatic than it had been
in earlier affirmative action cases. Ninety-one colleges and universities, as well as every major educational association, filed briefs in support of the university. Not one college or university filed a brief op99
posing affirmative action.
These briefs argued that "pluralistic,
widely representative" colleges provide a more enriching learning en00
vironment and better preparation for life in a multiracial world/ and
that a racially integrated student body is "critical to American democracy" because, among other things, a significant number of highranking public officials are graduates of elite colleges and universi-

(arguing that Bakke harmonizes equal protection, academic freedom and federalism by
"giving a degree of deference to a public university's academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits").
98
Brief of Amici Curiae of the State of Florida and the Honorable John Ellis 'Jeb"
Bush, Governor at 17-18, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) & Gratz v. Bollinger 123 S. Ct. 24ll (2003) (Nos. 02-241 & 02-516). Briefs supporting the university,
however, took issue with Florida's claim. A brief filed by a coalition of twenty-one
states and the Virgin Islands called attention to news reports that "[a]ides to Gov. Jeb
Bush of Florida admit that they settled on the 20-percent standard after computer
models of 10-percent and 15-percent policies failed to produce enough black and Hispanic students." Brief of Amicus Curiae State of Maryland, supra note 97, at 26 (quoting Jeffrey Selingo, What States Aren't Saying About the "X-Percent Solution," CHRON. OF
HIGHEREDUC.,June 2, 2000, atA31).
99
Whereas in Bakke, five briefs were filed on behalf of eight educational associations, colleges, and universities. Brief of Amicus Curiae Antioch School of Law, Re·
gents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-8ll); Brief of
Amici Curiae Board of Governors of Rutgers, et al., Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811); Brief of Amici Curiae Columbia University, et al., Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 ( 1978) (No. 76811); Brief of Amici Curiae the State of Washington and the University of Washington,
Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811); Brief of
Amicus Curiae Howard University, Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-8ll).
100
Brief of Amici Curiae Amherst College et a!. at 7, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.
Ct. 2325 (2003) & Gratz v. Bollinger 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003) (Nos. 02-241 & 02-516). See
also Brief of Amici Curiae American Education Research Association et al. at 4-15,
Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 24ll (2003) (No. 02-241) (summarizing research showing
that diversity in education promotes awareness, tolerance and leadership).
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101

ties.
Correspondingly, briefs filed by Fortune 500 companies and
102
other business interests claim that business needs a diverse pool of
potential employees in order to compete effectively in the global marketplace. To achieve this diversity objective, schools must be able to
consider race.
This emphatic, near-unanimous reaffirmation of affirmative action helped propel the University of Michigan affirmative action programs. Perhaps more significantly, a coalition of former high-ranking
officers and civilian leaders of the military (including William Crowe,
Bud McFarlane, Norman Schwarzkopf, and Anthony Zinni) joined
forces with longstanding supporters of affirmative action. In a brief
that figured prominently in both oral arguments and the Court's deci103
sion, the "military brief' linked "the military's ability to fulfill its
principal mission to provide national security" with existing preferential treatment programs at the nation's military academies and its
104
ROTC programs.
Noting the problems of low morale and heightened racial tension in Vietnam, the brief argued that "a highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps educated and trained to command
our nation's racially diverse enlisted ranks is essential to the mili,105
]
t ar [ y.
The amicus curiae filings in Grutter and Gratz are a testament to
106
the breadth and intensity of support for affirmative action.
By de101

See Brief of Amicus Curiae Association of American Law Schools at 4, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (No. 02-241) (urging that "lawyers and judges occupy
a distinctly powerful and privileged position within the American political system.").
102
There are six briefs supporting racial preferences from business or business
organizations (including briefs from sixty-five Fortune 500 Companies and eighteen
media companies), and all support affirmative action. In contrast, when the Supreme
Court heard Adamnd v. Peiia in 1995, no briefs were filed by major businesses or nonminority organizations. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
10
" Consolidated Amicus Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton,Jr. eta!., at 5, Grutter
v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) & Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003) (Nos.
02-241 & 02-516)); see alw Linda Greenhouse, justices Look for Nuance in Race-Preference
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2003, at Al (noting that "of the 102 briefs filed in the two
cases, this was the one that had grabbed the attention of Q]ustices across the [C]ourt's
ideological spectrum"); infra text accompanying notes 134-43 (describing how the
"military brief' lent support to the Court's conclusion that informed, respectable interest groups valued racial diversity).
104
Brief of Lt. Gen. Becton, supra note 103, at 5. For a discussion of how Lee Bollinger, then President of the University of Michigan, helped orchestrate the writing of
this brief, see Lyle Denniston, Military May Sway Court on Diversity, BOSTON GLOBE, June
22, 2003, at Al.
105
Brief of Lt. Gen. Becton, supra note 103, at 5.
106
For a discussion of the impact of such lopsided filings on the Justices, see James
F. Spriggs II & Paul]. Wahlbeck, Amicus Curiae and the Role of Infonnation at the Sujmme
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tailing the perceived benefits of affirmative action, they provided the
Court with information it could use to explain why racial diversity is a
107
compelling government interest.
In sharp contrast, opponents of
affirmative action remained politically isolated. The only notable
brief that supported this position was an ambiguous filing by the Bush
108
administration.
But as I will discuss that brief probably did more
harm to their cause than good. Indeed, when compared to other controversial social issues (abortion or religion in the schools), the absence of important, powerful voices on one side of the issue seems es. 11y star k . ]()<J
peoa
B. Trent Lott and the Bush Brief

The biggest boost for affirmative action may have come from an
unlikely source: George W. Bush. On January 15, 2003, the President
Court, 50 POL. REs. Q. 365, 377 ( 1997). For a somewhat competing argument, see Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 743, 830 (2000), which concludes that this "interest
group model ... finds only equivocal support" and defends, instead, a "traditional legal model" that focuses on whether amici submit legally relevant information to the
Court that is not already supplied by the parties to the case. In Grutter and Gratz, amicus support for the University of Michigan did provide the Court with legally relevant
information. See infra text accompanying notes 139-40 (discussing citations to amicus
filin!?,s in the Court's opinion).
07
The information contained in amicus briefs, moreover, may have figured into
the Justices' understanding of whether race diversity is a compelling interest. The military brief, for example, provided important information about the possible nexus between national security and race diversity. Brief of Lt. Gen. Becton, supra note 103, at 5.
108
Brief of Amicus Curiae Unites States at 1, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325
(2003) & Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003) (Nos. 02-241 & 02-516). V.'hile
briefs by the State of Florida and the Asian American Legal Foundation argued that
the Michigan plans were unconstitutional, see supra note 98 and accompanying text
(discussing Florida's brief), the Florida brief was obscured by the filings of twentythree other states and the Asian American Legal Foundation brief was dwarfed by sixtyfour others submitted on behalf of three hundred organizations supporting the university. For a discussion of these organizations supporting the university, see Diana
Jean Schemo, Doctors, Soldiers and Others Weigh In on Campus Diversity, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
23,2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 7. Cf Charles Lane, U-Michigan Gets Broad Support on Using
Race, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2003, at A1 (noting that opponents of preferences were
"backed mainly by relatively small conservative public-interest groups").
109
Compare, for example, abortion litigation. In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), pro-choice and pro-life interests filed roughly the same number of amicus briefs. Moreover, important amicus briefs by states, members of Congress, and state lawmakers were filed on both sides of the issue. See Lee Epstein, Interest
Group Litigation During the &hnquist Court Era, 9 J. LAW. & POL. 639 (1993) (analyzing
Webster's illustration of how governmental interests sponsor and coordinate cases). For
additional discussion of these briefs, see Susan Behuniak-Long, Friendly-Fire: Amici Curiae and Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 74JUDICATURE 261 (1991).
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announced that he "strongly support[s] diversity . . . including racial
diversity in higher education," but that he considered the University
of Michigan's affirmative action plans to be "[a]t their core" an un110
constitutional "quota system."
The very next day, the George W.
Bush Justice Department submitted a brief that, "far from insisting
that any consideration of race was impermissible, did not even ask the
justices to overturn the Bakke decision, ... [instead] allowing race to
111
be used as a 'plus factor."'
The brief argued that government "may
not employ race-based means without considering race-neutral alter112
natives and employing them if they would prove efficacious."
In
other words, unlike the absolutist filings of the Reagan and first Bush
administrations, the Bush Justice Department sought to steer a middle
path on racial preferences. Indeed, following the Court's decisions in
Grutter and Gratz, the President declared victory, "applaud[ing] the
Supreme Court for recognizing the value of diversity on our Nation's
I 13
campuses."
The President's decision is readily understandable. On the one
hand, he could not embrace the University of Michigan's programs
without alienating his conservative base, represented by Attorney
114
General John Ashcroft and Solicitor General Ted Olson.
On the
other hand, he could not risk rejecting affirmative action because his

110

Remarks on the Michigan Affirmative Action Case, 39 WEEKLY. COMP. PRES.
Doc. 71 (Jan. 15, 2003).
111
Linda Greenhouse, Muted Call in Race Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2003, at AI
(quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae Unites States, supra note 108, at 5). For this very reason, conservatives castigated the administration for "split[ting] the difference on racial
preferences" and thereby signaling the Court that "[a] conservative president does not
think that he can afford to stand unambiguously for colorblindness." Negative Reaction,
NAT'L. REV., Feb. 10, 2003, at 12.
112
Brief of Amicus Curiae Unites States, supra note 108, at 9.
113
Statement on the Supreme Court Decision on the Michigan Affirmative Action
Cases, 39 WEEKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 803 (June 23, 2003). Other high-ranking administration officials, including White House counsel Alberto Gonzales and Education
Secretary Rod Paige, also expressed approval of the decision. See John M. Broder, Administration Lawyer Lauds Affirmative Action Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2003, a t AIO
(referring to Gonzales' approval of the Grutter decision); Press Release, Department of
Education, Paige Issues Statement on Today's Supreme Court Decisions about University of Michigan's Admissions Policies (June 23, 2003) (noting Rod Paige's support of
race-neutral policies), available at http:/ /www.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/2003/06/
06232003a.html .
114
For news stories recounting Ashcroft and Olson's efforts to convince the President to file an absolutist brief against preferences, see Dana Milbank, Bush Aides Split
on Bias Case at U-Mich., WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 2002, at AI; Peter Schmidt, Bush Asks Supreme Court to Strike Down U. of Michigan 's Affirmative-Action Policy, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC.,Jan. 24, 2003, at A20.
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political advisors told him that he must do better with minority voters
to win reelection.''" Otherwise, growing minority populations, especially in closely divided states, could undermine his reelection bid.""
Fears of alienating minority voters were driven home when several
high-ranking minority appointees expressed their support for affirmative action both during internal deliberations about the Michigan
. pu bl"1c cLOrums. 117
cases an d 1n
Following racially insensitive remarks of then Senate majority
leader Trent Lott, the President had little choice but to publicly embrace racial diversity in higher education (if not the University of
Michigan plans themselves). In December 2002, Senator Lott appeared to embrace the segregationist appeals of Strom Thurmond's
118
1948 presidential campaign. The President immediately denounced
Senator Lott for making statements that "do not reflect the spirit of
our country" and, at least implicitly, "distanced himself from the Sen119
ate majority leader."
When the administration filed its brief in
January 2003, there was little question that the Lott imbroglio helped
120
push the administration towards its middle ground position.

11 5

Adam Nagourney, With His Eye on Two Political Prizes, the President Picks His Words
Carefully, N.Y. TIMES, jan. 16, 2003, at A26.
116
See Linda Chavez, Don 't Go Wobbly, Mr. Bush!, WALL. ST. j., Jan. 8, 2003, at Al4
(noting that "the conventional wisdom among some Republican politicos [is] that opposing affirmative action is a sure way to alienate [minority] voters"); Edsall, supra note
85 (describing Republican worries "that long-term demographic changes ... could result in major Democratic gains"); Nagourney, supra note 115 (noting that "minority
populations are expanding in so many closely divided states").
117
See Mike Allen, Counsel to an Assertive Presidency, WASH. POST, May 19, 2003, at
Al7 (discussing White House Counsel Alberto Gonzalez's "crucial role in persuading
Bush ... to call Michigan's system unconstitutional but remain silent on the broader
question of affirmative action"); David Firestone, From 2 Bush Aides, 2 Positions on Af
firmative Action Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2003, at Al7 ("Secretary of State Colin L.
Powell ... made it clear he remained a strong supporter of traditional affirmative action."); Michael Getler, Rice, Race and Reporters, WASH . POST, Jan. 26, 2003, at B6 (quoting National Security Advisor Condolezza Rice's statement that "it is appropriate to use
race as one factor among others in achieving a diverse student body."); Milbank, supra
note 114 (noting Gonzalez's opposition to an "administration stance against affirmative action"); Schmidt, supra note 114 (describing Gonzalez's concern about "a stand
against race-conscious admissions").
11 8
Adam Nagourney & Carl Hulse, Divisive Words: The Republican Leader; Bush Rebukes Loll Over &marks on Thurmond, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2002, at AI (quoting Senator
Lott at a party for Senator Thurmond).
11 9 !d.
120

See June Kronholz &Jeanne Cummings, Bush Decries Racial Preferences, WALL ST.
16, 2003, at A4 (noting that "[c]omplicating the political calculation [on affirmative action] was the recent rebuke of Sen. Trent Lott").

J., Jan.
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C. Protecting the Court's Turf
The political pressures that pushed the Bush administration to
distance itself from past Republican administrations underscore a
simple fact: twenty-five years after the Supreme Court signaled that
121
race can be "a factor" in college and university admissions, affirmative action has become so entrenched that the costs of taking a stand
122
against it are greater now than ever before.
For the Supreme Court,
these same social and political forces call attention to the institutional
cost of opposing affirmative action. Lacking the power to appropriate
funds or command the military, the Court understands that it must
123
act in ways that gamer public acceptance.
A Court decision that is
ignored or skirted does the Court little good. Likewise, the Court can
124
be hurt by a decision that prompts a political backlash.
When deciding Grutter and Gratz, the Justices had reason to believe that the Court could not stop colleges and universities from devising race-conscious admissions strategies. A brief filed by the University of Texas Law School in a 1996 preferential admissions case
warned: "If affirmative action is ended, inevitable political, economic
and legal forces will pressure the great public universities to [find ways

121

I use the word "signaled" because this feature of Justice Powell's opinion in Regents v. Bakke may well have been dicta. Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732,
739-42 (6th Cir. 2002) (arguing that Justice Powell's claim that diversity is a compelling
government interest is a binding precedent), with id. at 785-87 (Boggs,]. dissenting)
(arguing that Powell's claim is dicta). See also Alan]. Meese, Reinventing Bakke, 1
GREEN BAG 2d 381, 390 (1998) (concluding that lower courts should not treat Powell's
claim as binding precedent and should "feel free to reach their own conclusions about
the ~ropriety of employing racial preferences in the admission process").
22
At the time of Bakke, affirmative action was not entrenched. The Carter administration, for example, almost filed a brief opposing preferential admissions in
Bakke. See JOSEPH A. CALIFAl'\10, JR., GOVERNING fu\1ERICA 236-40 (1981) (discussing the
Justice Department's draft brief, which argued that racial classifications were "presumptively unconstitutional"). Today it is almost inconceivable that a Democratic administration would oppose affirmative action.
123
This, of course, is why Alexander Hamilton referred to the judiciary as "the
least dangerous" branch in THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 433 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). For much the same reason, an empirical study by psychologists Tom Tyler and Gregory Mitchell confirmed that "the public belief in the
Court's institutional legitimacy ... enhances public acceptance of controversial Court
decisions." Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionmy Legal Autharity: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE LJ.
703, 715 (1994); see also supra text accompanying note 18 (noting propensity of swing
Justices to take account of social and political forces).
124
For additional discussion of how the Court takes account of whether elected
officials will implement or subvert its decisions, see supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
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125

to maintain minority enrollments] ."
Consider, for example, plans
guaranteeing admission to the top ten or twenty percent of high
school seniors. Although ostensibly race-neutral, these plans are designed to ensure that a set percentage of Mrican Americans and His126
panics secure admission to flagship state universities.
Another example of an ostensibly race-neutral plan designed to boost minority
enrollment is the UCLA School of Law's creation of a separate admissions procedure for students interested in enrolling in that school's
Critical Race Studies program. Although this program is open to students of all races, this initiative is an example of so-called "proxies"
127
used to attract minority students.
Other proxies include "greater
faculty discretion" in admissions decisions and greater attention to
128
"socio-economic" status.
A decision repudiating affirmative action, moreover, would have
fueled Senate Democrat efforts to derail Bush judicial nominees.
Complaining that the Rehnquist Court engages in "conservative judicial activism," Senate Democrats have argued that the judicial confir129
marion process should be used as a check on the Court.
When

125

Jeffrey Rosen, How I Learned to Love Quotas, N.Y. TIMES, June I, 2003, § 6
(Magazine), at 52, 54 (quoting the amicus brief to Supreme Court by three University
of Texas professors).
126
Since many high schools are racially isolated, these plans guarantee admission
to minority students who attend predominantly minority schools. See supra text accompanying note 98 (discussing Florida's twenty percent plan). Texas's plan has also
"resulted in a nice increase in minority participation and enrollment at universities
and post-graduate studies." Milbank, supra note 114 (quoting White House spokesman
Ari Fleischer in discussion of Texas plan as being devised by Bush when he was that
state's governor).
127
See Daniel Golden, Schools Find Ways to Achieve Diversity Without Key Tool, WALL
ST. J., June 20, 2003, at AI (providing an example of a proxy, namely interest in
UCLA's Critical Race Studies program).
128
/d. For example, at the University of California, Berkeley, law school officials
created a system of "individualized assessment" that enabled them to admit nearly as
many minority students after a voter-approved anti-affirmative action initiative as before the initiative's approval. Richard Sander, Colleges Will Just Disguise Racial Quotas,
L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2003, at Bll.
129
As I have detailed elsewhere, I think that complaints of "conservative judicial
activism" have relatively little to do with Democrat disappointment or with Rehnquist
Court decision making; instead, these complaints are largely a smokescreen for Democrats seeking to repay Republicans for hardball politics over Clinton judicial nominees
and, more generally, to constrain the Bush White House. See Neal Devins, The Federalism-Rights Nexus: l!.xplaining Why Senate Democrats Can Tolerate Rehnquist Court Decision
Making But Not the Rehnquist Court, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1307, 1307-09 (2002) (suggesting that the objectors to the Rehnquist Court come from polarization between Republicans and Democrats, and bitterness over the Court's involvement in the 2000 presidential election).
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Democrats controlled the Senate Judiciary Committee in 2001 and
2002, a handful of Bush nominees were either rejected or put on hold
13
because of their views on civil and abortion rights. ° Following the
2002 midterm elections (when Republicans regained control of the
committee), Senate Democrats have filibustered a number of Bush
131
federal court of appeals nominees.
Considering the widespread support for affirmative action in
Congress and the states, there is little question that a Court decision
that rejected both of the Michigan plans would have quickly spilled
over to the confirmation process. By ruling in favor of affirmative action (as well as gay rights and family leave protections), the Court
132
helped neutralize Senate Democrat complaints.
In other words, Justices who do not strongly disapprove of racial preferences would have
133
good reason to steer clear of this controversy, especially since it is
doubtful that colleges and universities would truly conform to a Supreme Court decision calling for color-blind admissions.

° For example, civil rights groups launched a successful campaign against Bush's
efforts to elevate District judge Charles Pickering to the Fifth Circuit. See Helen Dewar
& Amy Goldstein, A.ppeals Court Choice Rejected: Senate Panel Hands Bush 1st Defeat on judicial Nomination, WASH. POST, Mar 15, 2002, at AI (discussing 10 to 9 party-line votes
in the Senate judiciary Committee). Claims that Pickering displayed "insensitivity and
hostility" to voting rights, desegregation, and other civil rights reforms, People For the
American Way, Thanks Senators for opposing Extremist Bush Nominees at http:/ I
www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid=7794 (last visited Oct. 19, 2003),
prompted Senate Democrats to argue that Pickering would "supplant[] the law with
his conservative views." Amy Goldstein & Helen Dewar, Democrats Challenge Choice of
Miss. judge, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2002, at AS. Mter the Republicans regained control of
the Senate in 2002, President Bush renominated Pickering. Neil A. Lewis, A. judge, a
Renomination and the Cross-Burning Case That Won't End, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2003, at
Al6. Senate Democrats then filibustered the nomination. See Neil A. Lewis, Filibuster
on Nominee to Court Seat Suroives Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2003, at AIO.
131
See, e.g., id.; Helen Dewar, Nomination of Tex. Judge is Blocked, WASH. POST, May
2, 2003, at A2 (describing the first two filibustered nominations); RobertS. Greenberger, &trada's Withdmwal May Spur Political Bickering, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 2003, at B2
(discussing Democratic senators' continuing fight to block the nominations of two
more federal court of appeals nominees, Alabama Attorney General William Pryor and
Los Angeles Superior Court judge Carolyn Kuhl); Rainbow Filibuster Coalition, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 15, 2003, at A20 (noting that additional nominees "[c]oming up on the filibuster hit parade [are] Henry Saad, ... nominated for the Sixth Circuit ... [and] ...
Janice Brown, ... nominated for the D.C. Circuit").
132
See infra text accompanying note 163 (discussing Congressional approval of the
Court's ruling).
'" See Merrill, supra note 31 (noting that O'Connor and Kennedy often vote to
deny certiorari in cases raising divisive social issues); Thomas & Taylor, supra note 15,
at 49 (noting that O'Connor "doesn't like to be part of polarizing decisions"). For additional discussion, see supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
13
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When deciding Grutter and Gratz, the Supreme Court paid hom134
age to the majoritarian forces beating against it. Indeed, the Court's
conclusions about whether and how colleges and universities can take
race into account are perfectly in sync with social and political forces.
While a single Justice (Sandra Day O'Connor) is largely responsible
for the Court's balancing act, the fact remains that six Justices explic135
itly ruled that race-based admissions are constitutionally permissible
(and a seventh, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, sidestepped that
136
question) .
Likewise, six Justices explicitly ruled that both quotas
and mechanical formulas that award a certain number of points to all
137
minority students are unconstitutional (and a seventh, Justice John
138
Paul Stevens, sidestepped that question) .
The least surprising feature of the Court's rulings is its conclusion
that racial diversity is a compelling governmental interest. Mainstream amici (even those, like the Bush administration and State of
Florida, who thought that the two Michigan programs went too far)
139
were unanimous in their embrace of racial diversity.
In Orutter, the
majority relied on these amicus filings and cited briefs by the Bush
administration, educational associations, colleges and law schools, big
140
business, and the so-called "military brief."
It did not matter that

134

Indeed, for only the second time in its history, the Court allowed for the live
broadcast of oral arguments in the case. This decision reflected the Justices recognition of "the extraordinary public interest" in the case. Eavesdropping on Histary, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 2, 2003, at A20.
135
In addition to Justices O'Connor, Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens (the
Gruttermajority),Justice Anthony Kennedy reached this conclusion. 123 S. Ct. at 2370
(Kennedy,J., dissenting).
136
See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2365 (Rehnquist, Chief J., dissenting) (avoiding comment on the constitutionality of race-based admissions, and limiting his opinion only
to "the limited circumstances when drawing racial distinctions is permissible") (internal citations omitted).
137
In addition to Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas
(the Gratz. majority),Justice Breyer expressed this view in a concurring opinion. 123 S.
Ct. at 2433-34 (Breyer,J., concurring).
138
See Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2434-38 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (remaining silent on the
merits of the case and arguing that the plaintiffs' claims were no longer ripe).
139
See supra text accompanying notes 91-107. Of these amici, the State of Florida
was the only one to explicitly argue that this compelling interest could not be pursued
through race-conscious admissions programs. See Brief of Amici Curiae of the State of
Florida, supra note 98 at 4-5.
140
The Court cited eight amicus briefs in this part of its opinion. Cruller, 123 S.
Ct.at2336,2340,2341,2345.
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some of these briefs advanced interests, such as national security, that
were not advanced by the University. Rather, the Court wanted to
make clear that racial diversity was compelling, and that informed, re141
spectable interests overwhelmingly supported it.
Under these circumstances, a contrary holding would have been judicial hubris, plac142
ing the Court's views ahead of all others.
For the same reason, it is unsurprising that the Court would find
that colleges and universities may take race into account. In particular, once the Bush administration signaled that preferential admissions schemes are sometimes constitutional, majoritarian forces over143
whelmingly supported the Court reaching a similar conclusion.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who had never voted to approve a racebased preference scheme, undoubtedly saw her approval of preferential admissions as simply cementing the status quo (with business,
educational, and elected government interests all backing preferences).144 More tellingly, the dissenting opinions in Grutterunderscore
the breadth of support for affirmative action. Not only did swing Justice Anthony Kennedy explicitly embrace race-conscious university
admissions, Chief Justice Rehnquist never questioned whether race
can be used in admissions. Instead, his dissent was limited to how the
145
law school took race into account.
The real question in Grutter and Gratz was how much latitude
schools would have when employing race and, relatedly, whether the
Court would approve one of the University of Michigan plans. As I
will now explain, the Court's decisions were a picture-perfect reflec141 The term "respectable" was used by Bill Van Alstyne when discussing the
sources of support upon which the Court relied in its opinion. Discussion with Bill
Van Alstyne, William R. Perkins and Thomas C. Perkins Professor of Law, Duke Law
School, in Williamsburg, VA (Feb. 2003).
142 Even though the Court's citation to amicus briefs showed that opponents of
affirmative action were politically isolated, it may also be that these briefs were cited
because they alerted the Justices to legally relevant information. See supra text accompanying note 106 (noting that these briefs gave the Court information it could use in
formulating its opinion).
143 See supra text accompanying notes 96-101, 109-11 (listing numerous amicus
briefs submitted in support of allowing race to be used as a factor in college and universi~ admissions).
1 4
For a perceptive treatment of O'Connor's embrace of the status quo, see Michael Klarman, Are Landmark Court Decisions All That Important?, CHRON. HIGHER
Eouc., Aug. 8, 2003, at B10-ll.
145 See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2365 (Rehnquist, Chief J., dissenting) ("I do not believe, however, that the University of Michigan Law School's ... means are narrowly
tailored to the interest it asserts .... [T]he Law School's program is revealed as a naked effort to achieve racial balancing.").
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tion of the social and political forces beating against it. With that said,
I am not contending that the Court had no choice but to approve one
of the two Michigan programs. A decision, for example, approving
some race-based admissions schemes but striking down both plans as
mechanistic quota-like systems would have reflected social and political forces. Such a decision would have appealed to a Justice like Anthony Kennedy, who found the Michigan plans offensive but still
146
wanted to take social and political forces into account.
Nevertheless, social and political forces strongly supported the
Court's decision to uphold the law school program that purportedly
147
provided "meaningful individualized review of applicants," while
striking down the undergraduate program because it did not consider
"the particular background, experiences, or qualities of each individ148
ual applicant."
A decision striking down both programs-even one
that recognized that individualized treatment of race is constitutionally permissible-would have come at a cost. As previously mentioned/49 such a decision might have been portrayed as anti-civil rights
and spilled over to confirmation politics and the 2004 elections. In
addition to placing the Court in the middle of a political imbroglio, a
decision striking down both programs (while recognizing that race diversity is a compelling interest) would have clarified very little. In response, colleges and universities likely would either come forward
with new affirmative action plans or new explanations as to why they
have no choice but to adhere to existing preferential admission programs.150 Over time, there would be new circuit conflicts and increas-

146 Along the same lines, Justice O'Connor's approval of the law school plan may
well have been tied to her belief that the Court must work to achieve "both the perception and the reality of equal justice" because "a substantial number of our citizens believe our legal judicial system is unresponsive to them because of racial bias." Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, Remarks of the Honorable Sandra Day O'Connor, Recipient of
the Honorary Degree Doctor of Laws (May 25, 2003), available at http:/ I
www.gwu.edu/-media/pressrelea~e.cfm?ann_id=6782; see also Sandra Day O'Connor,
Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1217, 1217 (1992)
(noting that Marshall's "personal histories and experiences" shaped O'Connor's thinking). For additional discussion, see infra note 162 (noting the connection between
O'Connor's decision in Grutterand relevant social and political forces).
147 Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2431 (O'Connor,]., concuning).
148 ld.

149

See supra text accompanying notes 114-16, 129-31 (identifYing potential effects
of a decision against affirmative action).
150 See supra text accompanying notes 125-28 (listing various plans used to maintain or increase minority enrollment); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae American Education Research Association, supra note 100, at 25-29 (arguing that a school's compelling
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ing pressure for the Court to issue a more decisive opinion. A decision upholding the law school program therefore comports with the
Rehnquist Court's post-1995 practice of shifting its energies away from
151
divisive social issues.
'What then can we take from Justice Scalia's claim that the Court's
qualified approval of racial preferences "seems perversely designed to
152
prolong the controversy and the litigation"?
For Justice Scalia, future litigation would examine whether a school's consideration of
race, in fact, is individualized, and whether the school's expressed
commitment to diversity is a mere smokescreen to disguise discriminatory admissions. These claims, however, ignore the Court's methodology in Grutter and Gratz. Specifically, the Court drew a sharp line
between admissions systems that purportedly allow for independent
consideration of each applicant and "nonindividualized [and] mechanical" formulae that mandate that all minority applicants be
placed in a separate admissions pool, be given a specified number of
153
bonus points, etc.
For the majority, the latter category is clearly impermissible, while the former category is subjected to deferential review and is almost certainly permissible. In Grutter, for example, the
Court "[took] the law school at its word that it would like nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions formula" and that it consid154
ers each applicant's claim that she will add to the school's diversity.
The fact that the law school distinguished among groups of underrepresented minorities (preferring Mrican Americans to Hispanics and
155
Native Americans) was considered irrelevant.
Likewise, the Court
saw no reason to discuss why it was that the law school seemed to look
to the percentage of Mrican Americans in its applicant pool in determining how many admissions offers it would extend to Mrican Americans.156 Finally, the Court did not explore why the percentage of

interest in race diversity can only be pursued through race-conscious admissions
schemes).
151
See supra text accompanying note 64 (identifying the Rehnquist Court's denial
of certiorari to socially divisive cases).
152
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2349 (Scalia,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
153 Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2433 (O'Connor,]., concurring).
4
"'
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2346. Indeed, the Court accepted the law school's claim
that it admits nonminority students "who have greater potential to enhance student
body diversity over underrepresented minority applicants." !d. at 2345.
155
Chief justice Rehnquist made much of this fact in his dissent. See id. at 2366-67
(Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (noting the differences in the "critical mass" of students
sought from different minority groups). The majority opinion did not respond.
156
See id. at 2368-69 ("But the correlation between the percentage of the law
school's pool of applicants who are members of the three minority groups and the
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minority offers "at no point fell below 12%, historically defined by the
157
Law School as the bottom of its critical mass range."
By granting broad latitude to colleges and universities that employ
ostensibly individualized admissions systems, Gruttervalidates claims by
lawmakers and elites about both the importance of race diversity and
the difficulties schools face when pursuing this end. Majoritarian
forces did not support the validation of the undergraduate admissions. While elected officials, interest groups, and newspapers over158
whelmingly back preferences, quotas are taboo.
More significantly,
public opinion polls support the placing of limits on affirmative action. These polls show that the American people, while supporting
159
racial diversity in higher education, oppose racial preferences.
Opinion polls, however, also reveal that the Court has significant leeway to decide what kinds of affirmative action are constitutionally
permissible. For instance, fewer than one in five white voters claimed
that affirmative action would play a significant role in sorting out their
160
presidential preference, and one day after Californians approved an
anti-affirmative action initiative, an exit poll revealed that neither Republicans nor Democrats would rank affirmative action as one of the

percentage of the admitted applicants who are members of these same groups is far
too precise to be discussed as merely the result of the school paying 'some attention to
the numbers."').
157
Id. at 237I (Kennedy,J., dissenting); see also Mark V. Tushnet, The Supreme Court
and Affirmative Action, AALS NEWSLETTER, Aug. 2003, at I (suggesting that Michigan
Law School had a "rough target percentage of minorities," and that the school "might
increase" the weight given to race "to ensure that the target was met"). The majority,
however, did note that the range of minority students in each class "varied from I3.5 to
20.1 percent, a range inconsistent with a quota." I23 S. Ct. at 2343. In response, the
dissenters noted both that the law school monitored the number of minority students
who accepted its offers, id. at 2372 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), and, correspondingly,
that the school could only control who it made offers to, not who enrolled at the law
school. /d. at 2369 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
158
Even Bill Clinton, a strong advocate of racial preferences, rejected mechanical
formulas designed to ensure proportionate minority representation. See Lewis, supra
note 74, at AI (discussing Clinton's withdrawal of Lani Guinier's nomination in response to Senate Democrat complaints). Correspondingly, I do not think that the
Court felt pressure to uphold the college plan because amici, instead of distinguishing
the two plans, argued that both plans were constitutional. The Court knew that the
concern of amici was the approval of racial preferences and the granting of wide latitude to colleges and universities in implementing affirmative action programs. This is
precisely what the Court did and, not surprisingly, amici were oveljoyed by the Court's
mling. See infra text accompanying notes I67-68 (recounting popular expressions of
support for the Court's approval of diversity as a permissible goal).
159
Langer, supra note 91.
160
Jennifer L. Hochschild, The Stranger Career of Affinnative Action, 59 OHIO ST. LJ.
997, IOOI (I998).
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161

top seven issues facing voters.
Thus, Americans would certainly accept a decision approving some, but not all, racial preferences. The
question of how much latitude the Court was giving universities simply
would not register with most voters.
The Court therefore had strong reason not to give colleges and
universities a carte blanche to sort out if and when race should be
162
taken into account.
By upholding the law school's "individualized"
consideration of race while rejecting the college's across-the-board
plan, '" [ t] he court comes across as temperate, reflecting the complex163
ity of opinion in the public itself. "'
Furthermore, knowing that its
decisions would be embraced by elected officials and opinion leaders,
the Court (by ruling against the college in the face of widespread amicus support for the college) was able to appear independent and
countermajoritarian without worrying about possible political reprisals.
CONCLUSION

Reaction to the Court's approval of race-based preferences, not
surprisingly, was overwhelmingly positive. The decisions were hailed

161

/d.

162

In Grutter,Justice O'Connor recognized the costs of giving colleges and universities unbounded authority. She notes that schools should, if possible, consider raceneutral alternatives. See 123 S. Ct. at 2346 ("Universities in other states can and should
draw on the most promising aspects of these race-neutral alternatives as they develop."). She also concluded her opinion by commenting that it "has been 25 years
since [Bakke]" and that "25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer
be necessary to further the interest approved today." /d. at 2346-47. By qualifYing the
Court's support for affirmative action, O'Connor signaled that her decision to uphold
the law school program was tied to social and political forces, including her publicly
expressed concern about the Court's need to improve its image on race issues. See
O'Connor, Remarks of the Honorable Sandra Day O'Connor, supra note 146 (illustrating O'Connor's opinion on race and the judicial system).
163
David Von Drehle, Court Mirrors Public opinion, WASH. POST, June 24, 2003, at
AI (quoting Andrew Kohut, director of the Pew Research Center). For Justice
O'Connor, moreover, this distinction comports with her dissent in Metro Broadcasting, a
case upholding diversity preferences for minorities. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C.,
497 U.S. 547, 602 (O'Connor,]., dissenting) (suggesting that O'Connor would support
a government program sponsoring individualized consideration of race in admissions,
but not one as broad in its use of race as a qualification as was the one in this case).
For Justice O'Connor, nonindividualized diversity preferences wrongly assumed that
all minorities would make similar programming decisions. See id. ("To uphold the
challenged programs, the Court departs ... from our traditional requirement that racial qualifications are permissible only if necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling interest.")
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64

by the President and his aides/ by every Democratic presidential
165
contender, by eight of the nine Senators and Representatives who
66
spoke about the case on the floor of Congress/ and by nearly every
major newspaper. Colleges and university officials likewise embraced
the rulings, noting that they now "planned to focus on finding ways to
shield race-conscious admissions policies against future legal chal,167
1enges.
The question remains: will the Court's rulings settle the affirmative action wars once and for all (at least with respect to preferential
school admissions)? Mter all, if social and political forces strongly
back affirmative action and the Supreme Court has blessed preferential admissions, it seems as if there is no prospect of an affirmative action counterrevolution. Indeed, even though future Supreme Court
appointees might transform the Rehnquist Court in ways that cannot
be predicted, the political forces that pushed for the defeat of Robert
Bork and Republican Party acquiescence to affirmative action will
168
probably stand in the way of the Supreme Court's reversal of Grutter.
On the other hand, even though anti-preference ballot initiatives
stalled in the face of mainstream Republican opposition, it is possible
that the leaders of this ballot initiative movement will be energized by
169
the Court's rulings.
Also, affirmative action may fall under the

1 4

See sources cited supra note 113 (noting reaction of Bush and his appointees).
Democratic candidate comments to the Court's decision can be found in Associated Press, Dem's Target: Bush, CHI. TRIB.,June 23, 2003, at 3.
166
Congressional Record data is based on a search for references to the case immediately after the Court's decision Qune 23-27, 2003). See 149 CONG. REc. H94,5799
(daily ed.June 24, 2003) (statement of Rep. King); 149 CONG. REc. S94,8432 (daily ed.
June 24, 2003) (statement of Sen. Durbin); 149 CONG. REC. S95,8548 (daily ed. June
25, 2003) (statements of Sens. Kennedy and Feingold); 149 CONG. REC. E 97,1386
(statement of Rep. Clay).
167
Peter Schmidt, College Leaders Discuss Ways of Preserving Affirmative Actions,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 17, 2003, available at http:/ /www.chronicle.com/
daily/2003/07 /2003071702n.htm.
168
That is not to say that lower court judges will not narrow the decision. Also, it
is certainly imaginable that, following the 2004 elections, conseJVative interests will
successfully push both the White House to nominate and the Senate to confirm a Justice sympathetic to the conseJVative social agenda. Jonathan Groner, Alberto Gonzales:
A Washington Education, LEGAL TiMES, Mar. 3, 2003, at 12 (describing the mixed opinions of conseJVatives on the possibility of Gonzales as a Supreme Court Justice). If that
happens, the Court may reflect the growing power of conseJVatives and pursue the social conseJVative agenda by, among other things, narrowing Grutter.
169
See V. Dion Haynes, New Battle on Affirmative Action: opponents Plan to Seek Ban
Via Vote in Michigan, CHI. TRIB.,July 8, 2003, §I, at 5 (noting ongoing effort to put an
anti-affirmative action initiative on the Michigan ballot). But see Rebecca Trounson &
Nancy Vogel, The Recall Election, Pr(}jlositions 53 and 54, Both Ballot Measures Go Down in
r.

165
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weight of the nation's changing demographics. In particular, with an
increasingly diverse and ever-growing minority population, there is
good reason to question the political saliency of affirmative action
170
plans that are limited to just a few groups.
In the short run, however, the Court has responded to social and
political pressures. Its decision, moreover, seems designed to keep
the Court out of this thicket and return the issue to the states, where
schools, elected officials, and voter initiatives can sort out the details
of racial preferences. In so doing, Grutter and Gratz are emblematic of
the Rehnquist Court's practice of operating within parameters set by
social and political forces.

Defeat, Backers Say the Racial Data and Infrastructure Praposals were Lost in the Recall Hys·
feria, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2003, at A26 (discussing the October 2003 defeat of an antiaffirmative action initiative in California).
170
More generally, rising rates of interracial marriage and changing immigration
patterns suggest that race and ethnicity are "extremely fluid," "increasing[ly] arbitrar[y]" constructs. George F. Will, Crude Remedy for a Disappearing Problem, WASH.
POST, June 24, 2003, at A21. But see Orlando Patterson, Ajji1mative Action: The Seque~
N.Y. TIMES, june 22, 2003, at Dll (arguing that political support for affirmative action
is now tied to limiting preferences for Mrican Americans, Native Americans, and most
Latinos).
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